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Abstract—Ad targeting is getting more powerful with introduc-
tion of new tools, such as Custom Audiences, behavioral targeting,
and Audience Insights. Although this is beneficial for businesses
as it enables people to receive more relevant advertising, the
power of the tools has downsides. In this paper, we focus
on three downsides: privacy violations, microtargeting (i.e., the
ability to reach a specific individual or individuals without their
explicit knowledge that they are the only ones an ad reaches)
and ease of reaching marginalized groups. Using Facebook’s
ad system as a case study, we demonstrate the feasibility of
such downsides. We then discuss Facebook’s response to our
responsible disclosures of the findings and call for additional
policy, science, and engineering work to protect consumers in
the rapidly evolving ecosystem of ad targeting.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past several years, advertisement platform providers
such as Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Pinterest, have de-
veloped and released a suite of new tools for advertisers.
Those tools leverage the consumer information gathered by
the platforms to deliver advertisements more effectively, i.e.,
help advertisers in targeting or reaching an audience who may
be interested in their ads, as determined by the advertiser and
the ad platform’s algorithms. Although these tools have been
a boon for advertisers, each new tool and feature potentially
brings new threats to consumer privacy and the welfare of
society.
Personally Identifying Information Audiences (PII Audi-
ences [1]), also referred to as Custom Audiences by Face-
book [2], Customer Match Audiences by Google [3], or
Tailored Audiences by Twitter [4], are an example of one
such tool. PII Audiences are advertisement audiences that are
created by uploading individuals’ personal information, such
as email, full name, age, zip code, in order to then deliver
advertisements to their associated social media accounts. This
mechanism is intended to allow advertisers to perform remar-
keting across different platforms and to bridge the gap between
offline and online interactions [2]. For instance, an advertiser is
able to send targeted advertisements to customers who visited
their store-front and wrote down their name and email on a
sign-in list. Although being able to reach audiences via PII
Audience creation may be very useful for advertisers, it is
not hard to imagine that such audience reach or targeting
capabilities can also be misused for violating privacy. For
example, [1] have recently showed how PII Audience tech-
nology on Facebook’s advertising platform could be used to
de-anonymize website visitors, and uncover any user’s phone
number.
Another emerging advertising technology is demographic
and behavioral targeting. Social media websites such as Face-
book, Google, and Pinterest record and learn from user behav-
ior, taking into account their activity such as location, post con-
tent, likes, and self-reported (potentially private) information,
to create an internal representation of a user’s demographic,
interests, and behaviors. The platforms allow advertisers to
specify demographic and behavioral targeting criteria which
they then match to their learned profile information about
the users. For example, advertisers can specify that their ad
campaign should target “Females living in London interested
in Shopping between the ages of 18-24,” which means that
their ad should be shown to users that the ad platform thinks
fits these criteria – a few examples of such targeting criteria
are given in Figure 1 [5].
Again, such detailed targeting capabilities can be abused;
for example, by specifying a combination of criteria that
match only one individual, the ad campaign can single her
out and learn additional information about her [6]. The typical
protection put in place by ad platforms to prevent this kind of
attack is a threshold on the minimum number of users who
need to satisfy the targeting criteria before a campaign can be
run (Section IV). In addition to privacy violations, recent work
by [7] has shown that demographic and behavioral targeting
may also lead to illegal or discriminatory practices, such as
excluding individuals of certain race from seeing housing ads.
Finally, another recent tool, is Audience Insights, a collec-
tion of information reported to advertisers about the users
who were reached by their ad. A typical audience insights
dashboard goes far beyond the number of people who have
seen an ad, and includes information about their gender,
wealth and age distribution, interests, locations, etc. See an
example Audience Insights page from Facebook in Figure 2.
The intent of the tool is to describe the characteristics shared
by a large number of users reached by the ad; however, if
not properly implemented, it can be exploited to learn private
information about individuals. Again, the privacy protections,
if any, typically put in place for such a tool are thresholds
chosen in an ad-hoc manner.
In this work, we demonstrate that despite all the attention
devoted to possible harms caused by Facebook’s advertising
platform and Facebook’s stated commitments to privacy, the
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Fig. 1: Targeting Criteria Infographic [5]
Fig. 2: Audience Insights [8]
ad platform can still be exploited to violate privacy, and
to cheaply and effectively target individuals or marginalized
groups (Section II). We then describe Facebook’s response to
our findings and its implications for the privacy, accountability,
and transparency of its advertising platform (Section III). We
then briefly discuss the differences in practices of other adver-
tising platforms with respect to ad targeting (Section IV). We
conclude with a call for change: in accountability, transparency
and user control in ad targeting practices, in policy scrutiny
to such practices, and in engineering and scientific solutions
that could enable powerful targeting while provably preserving
privacy (Section V).
II. PRIVACY VIOLATIONS, MICROTARGETING, AND
MARGINALIZED GROUP TARGETING ON FACEBOOK
We identified three novel attack vectors:
A. Single-Person Insights (enabling privacy violations):
Facebook’s Audience Insights product can be used to learn
highly private information of an individual Facebook user. In
particular, given the knowledge of a person’s name, email
address and/or phone number, it is possible to learn Face-
book’s estimate of their age, household composition, interests,
income, etc. The reason is that Audience Insights can be run
on audiences as small as one person, and when run, insights
include 2,000+ categories of information.
B. Single-Person Targeting (enabling microtargeting):
Facebook’s Custom Audience feature can be exploited to run
Facebook-approved campaigns aimed at a single user. The
reason is that although Facebook applies a minimum threshold
on the Custom Audience size, that threshold is very small and
can easily be surpassed by including users who are known to
use AdBlock in the Custom Audience specification.
C. Single-House Location Targeting (enabling marginal-
ized group targeting): Facebook’s location targeting feature
can be used to run Facebook-approved ad campaigns that
target arbitrarily small locations (as small as a single house).
The reason is that although the location targeting feature
enforces a minimum 1-mile radius, it allows an arbitrary
combination of 1-mile radius circles that should be included
and excluded from the targeting, enabling one to achieve
targeting of a single house.
We describe each of these attacks in detail next. We believe
that the primary culprit for making them possible is that
Facebook’s approach to preventing privacy violations using
its ad tools is haphazard. With so many different, rapidly
changing advertising tools, many presumably developed by
different teams within Facebook, it’s difficult to keep track
and think of all corner cases and possible interactions between
the tools that may have privacy implications, unless one does
it using a principled, systematic, transparent, and accountable
approach.
A. Single-Person Insights
This attack vector allows the malicious user to gain informa-
tion about a single person using the Audience Insights feature
of Facebook’s advertising platform. Although the feature is
nominally intended to present insights about a large group of
people, our experiments show that it can be exploited to learn
information Facebook possesses about a single person. Insights
such as Income, Net Worth, Interested in Hunting, Buys Plus
Size Clothing, Housemates, etc., can be obtained about a
Facebook user merely by specifying their name, phone number
and/or email address; for attackers that have a Facebook App,
specifying the target’s Facebook ID suffices. Not only does
the information that can be learned include what Facebook
promises to protect from users who aren’t Friends, but it
also extends beyond the information one formally supplies
to Facebook, and may reveal to the advertiser the inferences
Facebook’s algorithms have made about the user. We describe
the approach for executing the attack next.
1) Create a Custom Audience, using a customer file of only
one person’s information. Supply Facebook adequate
information to uniquely identify the target user. This step
can be completed programmatically using the Custom
Audiences API, or via the graphical user interface.
2) Wait 4 hours (max 72 hours) for the newly generated
Custom Audience to become available in the Audience
Insights page.
3) Although the newly generated Custom Audience will
be considered invalid, it will still be available for use
in Audience Insights. Adding this Custom Audience as
a filter, navigate to the Page Likes Dashboard of the
Audience Insights tool.
4) On the Page Likes Dashboard, Facebook will show 5-10
of the Pages liked by the user. This enables one to verify
whether the targeting was successful, since if Facebook
was unable to locate the user, or if the user is inactive,
or Facebook was unable to get significant information
about them, their Page Likes Dashboard will not appear.
5) Sequentially apply filters from the list (some examples
are: “single,” “male,” “lives with housemates” one at
a time [8]). If the Page Likes Dashboard does not
disappear upon applying a filter, one can assume that
Facebook’s algorithm determines that the given user
meets the criteria selected by the filter. This is the
crux of how one can infer private information about
the user – the filters are very detailed, span over 2,000
categories, and range from information such as “net
worth” to “frequency of travel”. The only exception
to the information leak we have observed are sexual
orientation and life events, as the Page Likes Dashboard
does not appear when those filters are placed on small
audience sizes regardless of whether or not that audience
meets the filter’s criteria.
We ran an experiment executing the attack described on our
Facebook friends and Facebook friends who we requested to
unfriend us for the purpose of this experiment. In all cases,
the experiments were done after obtaining the individual’s
consent. For each individual, we recorded the information
we learned about them through the Single-Person Insights
attack and compared it with their self-report to us or our prior
knowledge about them. We were able to obtain highly accurate
information about many potentially sensitive aspects of their
lives, such as: Net Income, Relationship Status, Home Value,
Age (accurate within 1 year), Interests (Hunting, Dieting, etc.),
and Frequency of Travel.
Not only does the ability to make such inferences violate
Facebook’s promises to their users as stated in their privacy
policy, as the information that the individual has shared
with Facebook with “Friends Only”/“Only Me” designation
can be obtained by anyone, but it also violates reasonable
privacy expectations, as the Custom Audience Insights release
information that may not have ever been explicitly disclosed by
the individual to Facebook, only inferred from their behavior
or other sources. Hence, using the Custom Audience feature
one has the power of Facebook inference and data collection
capabilities, with no associated costs. Questions such as, “is
this person/their wife pregnant?” “how old are their children?”
“do they like to gamble?” “are they living at home, or with
roommates?” “do they hunt?” can all be answered, efficiently
and at no cost, by anyone.
B. Single-Person Targeting
Facebook’s ad targeting options, specifically the combina-
tion of the Custom Audience [2] feature with other targeting
criteria, can be exploited to run Facebook-approved campaigns
aimed at a single user. The reason is that although Facebook
applies a minimum threshold on the Custom Audience size
for delivering advertisements, that threshold is very small (20
people) and can easily be surpassed by a determined attacker
by including fake or complicit users, or users who block the
delivery of advertisements in the custom audience. Blocking
advertisements is trivial using a Chrome extension such as
Facebook Adblock [9].
The outline of the attack is as follows:
1) Select a group of 19 Facebook users who use Facebook
Adblock [9], are not active on Facebook, or whose
accounts you know are fake. Enter their information into
a CSV file with information fields that uniquely identify
them, and upload this CSV file as a Custom Audience.
2) Add the information of the target person to the CSV
file, again ensuring that the information is sufficient for
Facebook to uniquely identify that person.
3) Create a custom audience from the CSV file, using the
information of the 19 complicit accounts, plus the target.
4) Create and run an ad for the created Custom Audience.
The goal of Step 1 is to minimize the cost of delivering
the advertising message to a single person while meeting
Facebook’s threshold on the minimum audience size required
before a campaign can be run. By selecting users using
Facebook Adblock, one ensures that the ad is not delivered
to their client device, so, they will most certainly not click it,
and thus a Pay-Per-Click campaign will not incur costs other
than when it reaches the target individual.
When verifying the feasibility of this attack, we leveraged
the same base audience (users of Adblock) many times, in
custom audiences that differed by only one person. During
our testing, we didn’t encounter any problems, which suggests
that once one is able to create 19 complicit accounts, one can
utilize them in many Custom Audiences targeting different
people without being flagged.
C. Single-House Location Targeting
Facebook offers a location targeting feature for the ad
campaigns, which can be exploited to target a small geographic
area, as small as a single house, despite its threshold of a min-
imum 1-mile radius for targeting. The reason is that Facebook
allows an arbitrary combination of 1-mile radius circles that
should be included and excluded from the targeting, enabling
one to achieve targeting of a single house.
The outline of the attack is as follows:
1) Begin the process for running a Facebook Advertising
campaign, and navigate to the “Target by Location”
section.
2) Select the “Include” option, type in the location of
interest (an address), and constrict the radius to 1 mile.
3) Change the option for additional locations to “Exclude”
and drop pins around the perimeter of your original
“Include” Radius, constricting exclusion radii to 1 mile
as well. Repeat until you have geo-fenced the area of
interest (see Figure 3 for an example).
Fig. 3: Precise Location Targeting using Inclusion / Exclusion
of Areas
4) Run the ad. Facebook will deliver the advertisement
as long as there are over 20 users that match your
advertising campaign’s criteria.
We experimented with the following attack vector on houses
in our neighborhood, confirming ad delivery even when the
target area was only hundreds of feet wide.
This ad targeting capability makes it easy and cheap to
run advertising campaigns targeting specific people or specific
vulnerable populations, by simply specifying the geographic
location members of that vulnerable population visit, such as
a Planned Parenthood clinic, Rehab Center, Cancer Treatment
facility, etc. In the pre-Facebook-advertising world, one would
have to physically stand outside a Planned Parenthood location
in order to deliver a message to the visitors. Now with
Facebook, anyone in the world can do so via an ad campaign.
III. FACEBOOK’S RESPONSE AND POLICIES
All of the attack vectors mentioned above were reported to
Facebook’s Responsible Disclosure program upon discovery
and confirmation of viability via repeated trials of experiments.
Facebook responded to the disclosures with varying levels of
concern and promptness.
A. Single-Person Insights
We received a response in 4 days that consisted of a request
for video proof. Upon providing proof of the attack, Facebook
fixed the vulnerability by increasing the threshold necessary
for generating the Page Likes Dashboard for Audience Insights
on a Custom Audience. Now, only valid Custom Audiences
(20 people or more) are shown in the Audience Insights page.
Facebook awarded a bug bounty of $2,000 confirming that
“this may allow a malicious user to infer private information
of another user given the person’s name, email address and/or
phone number.”
B. Single-Person Targeting
Facebook has confirmed that they have received our report.
However, for 2 months after the report submission, Facebook
did not acknowledge or address it. This is a very slow response
time, indicating that preventing Single-Person Targeting is not
a priority for Facebook. When Facebook eventually responded,
they did not acknowledge a bug or award a bounty, but
asked for our suggestions for fixing it, or expectations for
how it should work. We suggested that Facebook increase
Custom Audience thresholds to levels matching those of other
companies, 500 - 1,000 people, making it more difficult for
such attacks to be executed. We also recommended that Face-
book make additional requirements for which members of the
Custom Audience are counted towards the minimum threshold.
Facebook has not yet responded to these suggestions.
C. Single-House Targeting
Facebook’s response to the report was to ask to “clarify how
this bug is able to compromise the integrity of Facebook user
data, circumvent the privacy protections of Facebook user data,
or enable access to a system within Facebook’s infrastructure.”
We followed up with a clarification that when extremely
precise location targeting, such as targeting of a single house
or building, is allowed, it gives the advertiser data about
the performance of that campaign. Using the insights and
performance data that Facebook delivers, one can see the exact
number of people who have seen the ad, what age-group they
are in, their gender, and device type [10]. Facebook did not
respond to this concern and closed the bug bounty report, with
no ability for us to reply further.
D. Discussion of Facebook’s Response and Responsible Dis-
closure Program
Facebook’s response to our Whitehat Reports of “Single-
Person Targeting” that “This is working as designed” shows
an apathy toward microtargeting and circumventions of the
rudimentary microtargeting protections Facebook has put in
place. Facebook’s response to our “Single-House Targeting”
report shows a disregard for the need to limit the ease
of targeting marginalized groups. Furthermore, Facebook’s
advertising and data use policy do not prohibit or discourage
microtargeting [11], [12]. The policies do mention that an
advertisement cannot display “implied knowledge” (e.g., first
name, ethnicity, financial status) about the target [11]. How-
ever, this clarification does more to help advertisers conceal
microtargeted advertisements than to protect individuals.
Additionally, Facebook’s Whitehat program policies [13]
make it difficult, and, in some cases, impossible for researchers
to discover and report important attack vectors without violat-
ing the policies, particularly as it relates to attacks using its
advertising platform. In particular, their “policies only allow
testing against test subjects but not normal Facebook users.”
Not only is this inconvenient, but many of the attack vectors,
such as the “Single-Person Insights” attack could not have
been discovered with test users. This is because test users are
blank accounts and do not have any private data associated
with them, therefore our experiments would not have shown
any private information.
IV. OTHER BIG ADVERTISER POLICIES
We performed a brief survey of the advertising policies
and practices of three other tech companies with advertising
platforms. In Table I we present our findings on the minimum
thresholds used by them for PII Audiences and their position
on microtargeting, based on information we gathered from
testing their platforms and reading their relevant advertising
and data-use policies [3], [11], [14].
TABLE I
Company PII Audience
Threshold
Policy Prohibits Microtargeting?
Facebook 20 No
Google 1,000 Yes
LinkedIn 300 No
Twitter 500 No
With the exception of Google, no one takes a hard stance
on microtargeting in their policies. However, the minimum
thresholds enforced by Google, LinkedIn, and Twitter are an
order of magnitude larger than Facebook’s, showing a more
significant effort to prevent it, even if it is not prohibited. In
addition, when testing whether or not other companies rigor-
ously enforce their PII thresholds, we found that Twitter does
not allow inclusion of spam account (as decided by Twitter),
in its Tailored Audiences. This signals that there are varying
levels of attention being paid to enforcing minimum thresholds
and preventing their circumvention among companies, with
Facebook being the least concerned one.
V. CONCLUSION
The advent of powerful online ad targeting which is cur-
rently non-transparent threatens the well-being of both indi-
viduals and society at large.
At the individual level, microtargeting makes stalking and
harassment easy and cheap. With only a few cents, an attacker
can deliver targeted ads to a particular victim or to a group
of people satisfying certain characteristics in minutes. Fur-
thermore, as shown with our “Single-Person Insights” attack
vector and in previous work by [6], an attacker can use
microtargeting to gain highly private information on a given
user at no cost, and without being Facebook Friends.
At a societal level, ad targeting, particularly one that allows
microtargeting and a selection of audience according to arbi-
trary characteristics, can be used to effectively manipulate pub-
lic opinion. The most prominent example of this is the digital
campaign of Cambridge Analytica, which leveraged highly-
targeted and personality-based targeting criteria and content
to “divide and conquer” the public opinion via personalized
microtargeted advertisements [15], [16]. Although political
messaging is the most scrutinized area of ad targeting, it is
not inconceivable that there are other areas in which powerful
ad targeting in the hands of a manipulative entity can have
negative consequences, such as health, tolerance to opposing
view points, economic habits, education, etc.
Additionally, current and rapidly developing new advertis-
ing tools may result in ad campaigns that are discriminatory
according to age, sexuality, gender, wealth and even weight
with no legal recourse [7], [17], [18]. Recent work has also
shown that even proper moderation of feature-based targeting
(e.g., not allowing targeting by gender for job ads) is insuf-
ficient to prevent discrimination, as using new tools, such as
Lookalike Audiences [19] and PII Audiences, one can discrim-
inate without explicitly setting discriminatory features [20].
Given the magnitude and urgency of the problems posed,
we advocate for the following changes within the context of
Facebook’s advertising systems:
A. Full Transparency and Empowerment of Consumers
1) Transparency: We advocate for full transparency of
targeted ads: interested users should be able to see who
created each advertisement, all of its targeting criteria, and
the approximate number of people seeing the ad. Currently,
Facebook only displays the two most innocuous and public
targeting features, usually location and age when there may
be more insidious, personal targeting features at play [21].
2) Opt Out: We advocate that users should be able to ef-
fortlessly opt out of targeted advertisements, of being included
in custom audiences, lookalike audiences, etc.
Currently, an opt out of interest-based advertising based on
one’s activity requires painstakingly removing each interest
individually from the ad preference panel. For active Facebook
users, such a panel could include hundreds of interests and thus
require non-trivial time effort. Moreover, Facebook does not
let users opt out from all targeting categories, e.g., inferred
information, such as income range and home value, is not
presented to users in their ad preference settings [21].
3) Crowd-sourcing and Accountability: We advocate for
Facebook to give users the tools to meaningfully report
suspicious ads and advertisers, and for Facebook to analyze
those reports and take appropriate action with the advertiser
and report it to the user in near real-time.
B. New Engineering and Scientific Approaches
Machine learning, which has been successful in areas rang-
ing from NLP to vision, can also play a role in identifying ad-
vertisement campaigns and advertisers that aim to microtarget,
harass, or discriminate. Software engineering and testing tech-
niques could be brought to ensure that minimum thresholds are
applied systematically across all ad tools. Provable privacy
techniques such as differential privacy may be useful for
making existing ad tools such as Lookalike Audience provably
privacy-preserving [22] and informing the development of new
ones. We believe that close collaboration between ad platform
designers and academics with a true dedication to finding
new engineering and scientific approaches to the privacy and
microtargeting problems could lead to outcomes that would
benefit everyone in the ecosystem – the users, the ad platform
designers, the advertisers.
C. Policy Scrutiny
Finally, we advocate that policy makers and legal scholars
get engaged in influencing the practices of ad platforms, par-
ticularly in the cases when they can lead to privacy violations
and discrimination, via raising awareness of the issues and
developing approaches to holding the platforms liable [18].
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